tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5030145265861917845.post5107820469724475707..comments2024-03-28T14:35:30.147-04:00Comments on Tank Archives: World of Tanks History Section: Battle at LukhaninoPeterhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09622237223229485503noreply@blogger.comBlogger4125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5030145265861917845.post-8646465708130434282016-09-01T04:25:04.997-04:002016-09-01T04:25:04.997-04:00thanks i confirm it did worth sharing :)thanks i confirm it did worth sharing :)szemi50@gmail.comhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/18351782063994877261noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5030145265861917845.post-8103138672487413302016-08-31T05:32:35.741-04:002016-08-31T05:32:35.741-04:00If You think, my memo was a justification, or coul...If You think, my memo was a justification, or could be assumed as such, I am sorry. That is not my intent. I do not judge history. Historical events stand by themselve, we can describe them to the best of what the sources expose. In this regard, all factors need to be included. As You might have noticed, the memo is quite critical about and in fact highlights deficits in german command structure. I thought that would be worth sharing, as it goes some way to be relevant to the event under discussion.critical masshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/02366274198749901618noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5030145265861917845.post-59526383419573667862016-08-30T17:42:53.895-04:002016-08-30T17:42:53.895-04:00I find curious when I see people trying to justify...I find curious when I see people trying to justify German defeats at WWII as mostly a German fail and not an enemy win. It seems enemy is never skilled and they don't deserve the same justificating effort for the same type of defeats.Motzkorhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/18316989921665401048noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5030145265861917845.post-70823019290126024932016-08-28T11:27:47.998-04:002016-08-28T11:27:47.998-04:00Dayly loss reports for the germans indicate that l...Dayly loss reports for the germans indicate that losses on 5th and 6th were worst for the whole campaign, which is understandable in view of the fact that they were attempting to penetrate the strongest and best prepared soviet anti tank defenses in this period.<br /><br />Tank Regiment "Großdeutschland" had no more than 135 tanks servicable -and no PANTHERs among them.<br /><br />But problems were not only present in the disposition but also due to personalities and lack of battlefield experience in several commanding key positions, or outright incompetence.<br /><br />An example for the problem is that the command of PzBrig.10 -equipped with PANTHER tanks in PzBat 51 & PzBat52 was relegated from Decker to Strachwitz on July 6th. <br />Strachwitz, however, was ill suited to take command for the attack. Unlike Decker, Strachwitz had a tendency to attack ruthlessly -and in particular -without giving thought to flank protection, while attacking a well prepared defense.<br /><br />Repeatedly, he mislead the brigade into mine fields or prepared ambushes where tanks were immobilized or taken out from side attack and then, caught off guard, he frequently failed to order a timely way out.<br /><br />It didn´t help that Strachwitz and Decker didn´t like each others decision and often expressed openly their criticism in front of other officers. This joint conflict in effect stalled the staff of the brigade as noted by Guderians visit on july 10th.<br /><br />One of the two PANTHER tank battalions, PzAtb. 52 temporarely lost it´s commanding officer to an accident, which required a hospital leave just before the battle and in effect was lead through the operation instead by a string of inexperienced commanders with no battlefield experience, messing up the general operation of the unit. i.e. the commanders replacement failed by passing general informing to his company commanders before the attack about the tactical situation, intellegence and intent or conduct of attack. During an exposure to soviet artillery attack on july 6th, he finally lost nerves and had to be relieved from command. Command was then entrusted to a senior company chief, whose tank was shortly thereafter taken out by anti tank guns in ambush after only two hours in combat.<br />OKH send replacement to command PzAbt52, but the person committed had no experience in conduct of tactical operations and initially was present only to report about technical issues with the new tank. He was not up to the task to command a major tank formation at all and was soon relieved from command. It took until july 22nd, that the original commander of the unit returned and resumed command and restored full functionality of the unit.<br /><br />However, the misguidance on a tactical level by the Battallion was reinforced by a skilled soviet defensive and Strachwitz´s ruthless handling on the higher brigade level. The number of servicable PANTHERs dropped from 198 to 20 after two days of attack in this sector but it should be kept in mind, too, that the number of servicable tanks in Großdeutschland (no PANTHERs) dropped similarely from a high of 135 to only 32 after two days. Most of the tanks were only lightly damaged (immobilized) and could be recovered and returned to service but the number of total write offs was a significant component, indicating poow execution of command on behalf of Strachwitz, as confirmed later by Guderian, stating that basic principles of tank warfare were not followed under Strachwitz.<br />critical masshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/02366274198749901618noreply@blogger.com