D-10 and IS-2

"To comrade L.P. Beria

On installing the 100 mm D-10 gun produced by NKV factory #9 into the IS tank instead of the D-25 122 mm gun made by the same factory

In March of this year, I reported to you that NKTP factory #100 jointly with NKV factory #9 produced an experimental prototype of the IS heavy tank with a D-10 gun designed by factory #9.

Trials of the IS with a 100 mm gun showed that the 100 mm D-10 gun has undeniable advantages over the 122 mm D-25 gun as armament of the IS tank. These advantages are as follows:

Second Wind

"Award Order

Name: Stogniy, Ivan Alekseevich

Rank and position: Guards Lieutenant, officer reserve company with the 1st Independent Training Regiment of the Far Eastern Front

1. Year of birth: 1921
2. Nationality: Ukrainian
3. Party affiliation: VKP(b) member since May 1943
4. In the Red Army since: July 22nd, 1941
   Officer since: July 6th, 1942
5. Participated in combat (where and when): in the Patriotic War from July 10th, 1942, to August 30th, 1942, on the Western Front and the Kalinin Front.
6. Previous wounds or contusions: wounded near the abdominal ring of the left hip.
7. Previous awards: none
8. Recruited by: Lenin recruitment office in Kharkov

Discipline Abroad

"I order that:

1. Commanders and chiefs of political departments in units must immediately create strict order in their units, mobilize the communists and komsomol members to strengthen and maintain strictest discipline on behalf of literally every soldier and officer. Explain to all personnel that combat in Polish territory requires from each one of them even higher standards of flawless and honest behaviour everywhere and at all times. Each soldier who is chasing trophies, looting, drinking, or being a public nuisance on Polish territory must be immediately arrested and strictly disciplined by the courts.

Supply Drop

"Report on assistance to the uprising in Warsaw by elements of the 16th Air Army in September of 1944

On September 12th, 1944, based on the request from the Polish Committee of National Liberation, after the reception of representatives of the uprising that crossed to the eastern bank of the Vistula river, the Military Council of the 1st Baltic Front gave the following order to the commander of the 16th Air Army: to assist the uprising in Warsaw via delivery of weapons, ammunition, and supplies by air.

The execution of this task was assigned to the 9th Guards Stalingrad-Rechitsa Order of Suvorov Night Bomber Division (Po-2). On September 13th, individual Il-2 aircraft under fighter cover flew over the blocks held by the uprising forces dropping banners with notes containing the schedule of the Po-2 flights and means of communication with the uprising forces. In addition, to establish reliable communication and control over the delivery of the cargo, paratroopers equipped with radios were dropped into uprising held regions, who reported on their landing and location, and subsequently maintained communication with the 1st Baltic Front HQ, reporting on the situation in Warsaw and the amount of supplies dropped from Po-2 bombers that ended up in the hands of the uprising.

The Po-2 bombers set out with cargo for the uprising on the first time on the night of September 14th, 1944. Between September 14th and October 1st, the Po-2 bombers made 2243 sorties and dropped the following cargo:

• 45 mm guns: 1
• 50 mm mortars: 156
• Anti-tank rifles: 505
• SMGs and rifles: 2667
• Grenades: 41,780
• Ammunition (various): over 30 million
• Medicine: 0.5 tons
• Supplies: 113 tons

as well as communications equipment (telephones, cable, etc).

The actions of Po-2 bombers were supported by fighters and ground attack aircraft, who suppressed the most active enemy AA emplacements during the day. 14 Po-2 night bombers were lost between September 14th and October 1st.

Composed based on materials summarizing the actions of the 16th Air Army for September of 1944.

Senior Assistant to the Chief of Operational Research of the 1st Baltic Front Operational Department, Lieutenant-Colonel Pavlovskiy"

Via Valeriy Lisyutin.

Tiger Hunters

"Explanation of moving two 152 mm gun-howitzers to direct fire positions

At 20:00 on April 17th, 1944, the commander of the 60th Army, Colonel-General Kurochkin, summoned me to the observation post of the 302nd Rifle Division and ordered me to destroy the four Tigers that were at height 350.0, for which it was necessary to tow the guns to direct fire positions. I replied that this is an impossible task and that the guns will be destroyed before they could take positions. The general replied "If you lose the guns, you'll lose your head. Immediately move two guns to any hill and destroy those Tigers." 

I replied that six of my guns are in position to fire directly near the highway and I can open fire immediately. Upon arriving at my observation post I opened fire at one of the Tigers. After six shots, the Tiger retreated. I opened fire on the second one. After 5 shots, the sun set. (The range was 4 kilometers). 

The way I understood the general's orders was that he wanted the guns to be in any position where they could see the target. I had such guns, and therefore considered his orders carried out.

At 21:00 I received orders through the commander of the fire platoon of the 2nd battery (even though I have a line to the observation post of the commander of the 7th Breakthrough Artillery Corps) to move two guns of the 1st battery to height 351.0. I gave this order to the battery, and it lined up in travel position. 

At 23:00 I received a second set of orders to cancel the movement of the 1st battery and to carry out orders personally given to the brigade commander. I have never seen the commander of the 7th Breakthrough Artillery Corps face to face, and especially not today.

At 23:30 I sent the HQ Chief of the 1st Squadron, Captain Strizhak, to figure out these confusing orders. At 3:30 I received clarification: my orders are cancelled, carry out the army commander's orders. Having considered those orders carried out, I ordered the 1st battery to relocate to closed firing positions.

At 10:00 I received confirmation from the Chief of Staff of the 1st Glukhov Order of the Red Banner, Order of Suvorov, Artillery Division and the Chief of Staff of Artillery of the 60th Army regarding the execution of orders given by the commander of the 7th Breakthrough Artillery Corps. I immediately relayed the message to the commander of the 4th battery, which set out at 10:30, arrived at 13:00, and by 14:00 was ready to open fire on the orders from the commander of the 1st Artillery Division.

At 11:00 I personally set out to oversee the battery's work and to choose an observation post, which was placed on a nameless hill 1 km southwest of height 351.0, 100 meters behind the observation post of the 76 mm battery firing directly.

The battery did not fire on April 18th, 1944, because the tanks did not appear again.

Attachments: order of the commander of the 7th Breakthrough Artillery Corps and telephonogram, in two pages.

Commander of the 1st Guards Gun Artillery Brigade, Guards Colonel Semak

April 19th, 1944"

Via zihuatanexo

Far East Modernizations

"To the Chief of the GBTU TU

RE: #1142232

January 24th, 1944

1. Repair factory #105 developed blueprints and processes to rearm the T-37 and T-38 tanks to use the ShVAK gun. The mass of the tank increases by 100 kg as a result of rearmament. After being rearmed, the prototype was tested by firing on the move and by swimming. Trials show satisfactory results. Repair factory #105 is performing the rearmament. As of January 1st, 97 T-37/38 tanks have been rearmed with the ShVAK gun.

What's in a Name?

"Translated from German

General Staff of the Land Army #8/90583/44

February 27th, 1944

Top Secret

Copy #203

Contents: pseudonyms for new types of armament:

On the Fuhrer's directions, the following pseudonyms are introduced:

• Tank type V: Panther
• Tank type VI: Tiger
• 88 mm anti-tank gun on the chassis of the T-IV or T-III tank: Nashorn
• 88 mm assault gun: Elephant
• Radio controlled demolition tankette: Goliath
• Device for demolition of buildings using explosive gas mixtures: Typhoon
• Heavy anti-tank gun on the Tiger tank chassis: Jagdtiger
• Heavy anti-tank gun on the Panther tank chassis: Jagdpanther
• 75 mm anti-tank gun on the Lorraine type chassis: Marder I
• 75 mm anti-tank gun type 40 or 76.2 mm Russian gun on the T-2 tank chassis: Marder 2
• 75 mm anti-tank gun type 40 or 76.2 mm Russian gun on the T-38 Czech tank chassis: Marder 3

The accepted names for heavy artillery such as Bruno or Siegfried remain in force. Other pseudonyms for all types of armament and materiel such as Wespe, Hummel, Grille, Maultier, are cancelled.

Distribute to divisions inclusive.

Translated from German: Captain Bezymenskiy

Approved by the Chief of the 4th Intelligence Department of the 1st Belorussian Front, Colonel Smyslov."

Via Valeriy Lisyutin.

Mammoth Tank

"To the Commanders of Artillery of the 109th Guards Rifle Division and 86th Guards Rifle Division

Copy #2

To the Commander of the 92nd Guards Corps Artillery Regiment personally

New super-powerful "Mammoth" type tanks have arrived on the front lines and have been spotted near Shorakshar. The tanks are kept strictly secret. 

When "Mammoth" tanks are captured, it is necessary to keep them under extra guard to ensure the safety of their mechanisms and immediately report to the corps artillery HQ for subsequent evacuation to Moscow.

Commander of Artillery of the 10th Guards Rifle Corps, Guards Colonel Mihailov

Chief of Staff of Corps Artillery, Guards Major Ivanov

November 14th, 1944"

Via Yuri Pasholok.

IS Upgrades

"May 19th, 1944

List of work for the modernization of the IS-2 tank and ISU-152 SPG

1. Engine group
1. Installation of an Object 701 type radiator.
2. Installation of a horizontal fan.
3. Installation of fuel tanks in the engine compartment.
4. Redesign of the oil system caused by a change in layout.
5. Redesign of the water system caused by a change in layout.
6. Replace the exhaust with T-34 type.
7. Introduce shutters on the air intake.
2. Transmission group
1. Alteration of the main friction clutch to accommodate the fan linkage.
2. Redesign the gearbox to accommodate the fan linkage.
3. Installation of an Object 701 type fan linkage.
3. Electric equipment
1. Installation of four batteries.
2. Installation of an ST-700 starter.
4. Hull
1. Straight front plate 90 mm thick for rolled armour or 100 mm thick for cast armour, 130 mm thick turret platform front, Object 701 type "cork" driver's vision port.
2. Alteration of the engine deck to accommodate changes in the water system.
3. Alteration of the exhaust armoured covers.
5. Armament
1. Thickening of the front of the turret to 130 mm with the installation of the gun through the roof, similar to Object 701.
2. Object 701 style traverse mechanism.
3. Object 701 type turret ring.
4. Object 701 type low profile commander's cupola.
5. Rework of the ammunition racks to increase ammunition capacity.
6. Installation of a high caliber DShK AA machinegun.

The aforementioned items must be completed on each of the two experimental IS tank and SPG prototypes built according to this order.

Head of the Chief Designer's Department of the NKTP, Ber

Chief of the GBTU TU, Major-General of the Tank Engineering Service, Afonin"

CAMD RF 38-11355-2245

Last Rites

"To the Chief of the Personnel Losses Department of the 3rd Army

September 8th, 1944

#08

I report that in carrying out the orders of the Chief of the Rear #0210 issued on August 25th, 1944, deceased soldiers of the 348th Rifle Division are buried in divisional cemeteries indicated in orders of the division rear.

Divisional cemeteries are built far away from roads, on forest clearings or on outskirts of settlements that are not used for planting. Graves and gravestones are built according to standardized blueprints. Inscriptions are written in black pencil or are burned on. Graves are surrounded with a mound and with a fence.

Personal belongings of the deceased are collected by the chiefs of the burial teams. No looting was observed. 

The main points of order #0210 were covered with the personnel of the burial teams.

Chief of the Trophy Group

Captain Podunin"

Via zihuatalexo.

SU-85 Organization

"Order of the People's Commissar of Defense #0032

On the inclusion of SU-85 self propelled gun regiments into independent tank destroyer artillery brigades in the Reserve of the Stavka of the Supreme Command

August 2nd, 1944

In order to increase the firepower and mobility of fire of independent tank destroyer artillery brigades in the Reserve of the Supreme Command, I order that:

1. In the 15 independent tank destroyer artillery brigades that are in the Reserve of the Stavka of the Supreme Command, a self propelled artillery regiment with 21 SU-85 SPGs is to be added.
   The overall counts of the brigade will include 1852 men.
2. The Commander of the Armoured and Mechanized Forces of the Red Army must form and transfer to the Commander of Artillery of the Red Army 15 SU-85 SPG regiments in the following timeline:
1. 5 regiments by July 20th 1944.
2. 5 regiments by August 5th, 1944.
3. 5 regiments by August 20th, 1944.
   Select 15 officers to fill the position of deputy commander of the technical branch.
3. Chiefs of the NKO Central Directorates are to fill the brigades with personnel, armament, transport, and materiel.

People's Commissar of Defense

Marshal of the Soviet Union

I. Stalin"

RGVA 4-11-83 pp. 67-68

SKS Trials Attempt

Prototypes of the SKS carbine were ready by mid-1944. The logical step after that was to send them to the front for trials on the real battlefield. The weapons were sent to the 1st Belorussian Front, but there was a small issue.

"Your order #622590s given on June 28th, 1944, regarding conducting trials was received on July 15th, 1944, and carried out.

Further trials of the carbines have been held up by the difficult conditions for trials that have appeared on the front.

All combat units are engaged in nonstop fighting, making 15-20 km marches every day, which makes observing the carbines in battle and keeping them safe difficult.

Trials performed in these conditions, especially in brief time, will not allow us to establish the performance of the carbines and make conclusions regarding their acceptance into service. 

Based on these factors, I have made the decision to postpone trials until the situation at the front stabilizes."

Via Andrei Ulanov.

More MKb.42 Impressions

"Operational research department, 3rd Shock Army

Information Summary #01

January 1944

The model 1943 carbine-machinegun is designed to be used by infantry divisions that fight in forests. Two divisions in the Volkov and Holmsk directions had these weapons. Submachineguns have proven to be ineffective in the forest due to poor penetration. Machineguns are too heavy and not maneuverable enough. It is hard to aim and see when firing from the ground, and uncomfortable to fire from trees. machinegun-carbine combines the maneuverability of a submachinegun with the penetration of a machinegun. The system is well balanced and mobile. Firing in bursts has very light recoil. It is light and comfortable to use. One drawback is that it uses a special round with a shortened casing. Despite that, it has the penetration of a rifle at 400 meters. The magazines (30 round capacity, 7 are carried by each rifleman) are comfortable to use.

The weapon is gas-operated, tilting bolt. The effective range is 100-800 meters. Rate of fire: 500 rounds per minute."

Via Yuri Pasholok

Controlled Impact

"Order to the Red Army Air Force #0194

September 23rd, 1944

Moscow

Commanders of the Air Armies report that fighter pilots still use one of the most complicated attacks, namely ramming, to this day. 

In many cases, ramming does not only destroy the enemy plane, but also leads to a loss of our airplane, and, often, the death of the pilot.

Minesweeper

"May 27th, 1944

To the Chief of the GBTU Tank Directorate, Major-General of the Tank Engineering Service, comrade Afonin

Report on the issue of firing from the T-34-85M tank equipped with a PT-3 mine roller

According to orders from Deputy Chief of the GBTU, Lieutenant-General of the Tank Engineering Service comrade Lebedev, the NIBT Proving Grounds installed a PT-3 mine roller on a T-34-85 tank and determined the ability of firing from the tank after the detonation of a German TM-35 mine under the roller on May 26th and 27th, 1944.

Manufacturing Difficulty

"Completion of quota at factory #200 in August of 1944

In August of 1944, the factory was instructed to produce:

• IS-2 hulls: 200
• IS-2 turrets: 200

As of September 1st, the factory delivered and QA accepted:

• IS-2 hulls: 120
• IS-2 turrets: 120

The quota for August was completed by 60%.

This significant shortfall of production is explained mainly by exceptionally poor output of the metallurgical plants that were supplying armour, as well as mass food poisoning of assembly and mechanical plant workers in the cafeteria.

Considering that the poisoning had some effect on the output of the factory, the People's Commissar of Tank Production permitted the extension of the due date for the August quota until September 5th and supply of workers from mother factories, delivered by airplane, without reducing the quota for September.

The total quota for August and five days of September is:

• IS-2 hulls: 175
• IS-2 turrets: 175

The timelines for completion of the August quota are outlined in table #1.

In September, the factory must produce:

• IS-2 hulls: 200
• IS-2 turrets: 200"

CAMD RF 38-11355-2253 p.5

Yuri Pasholok writes that the annual report accounts for 200 hulls and turrets produced in August, so presumably the shortfall was made up for in September completely.

Far East Conversions

"To the Chief of the Tank Directorate of the GBTU, Major-General of the Tank Engineering Service, comrade Afonin

RE: your letter #822338 written on May 23rd, 1944

I report that:

1. As of June 1st, 1944, the Armoured and Motorized Forces of the Far East Front have applied applique armour to 128 BT-7 tanks, 113 of which were converted in 1942-43 and 13 in 1944.
   Since no proper quality armour was available, applique armour is only installed at factories during refurbishing. Armour of written-off tanks was used. Contoured armour for turrets is not available.
2. As of June 1st, 1944, 130 T-37/T-38 tanks have been converted to ShVAK guns. Further work to re-arm T-37 and T-38 tanks ceased due to an absence of ShVAK guns.
3. Repair factories #405 and #77 are converting two-turreted T-26 tanks into single turreted. As of June 1st, 1944, 35 tanks have been converted.
4. The following is necessary to continue work on rearming and adding applique armour:
1. Contoured armour for BT-7 turrets.
2. ShVAK guns.
3. TMFP-1 sights.
4. Equipment to convert two-turreted T-26es to single turreted (turrets, turret platforms, turret rings, etc).
5. Rearmament and installation of applique armour is not being planned due to a lack of aforementioned armament and parts.
   All BT-7s refurbished by the repair factories are being equipped with applique armour.

Acting Assistant to the Chief of the Armoured and Motorized Forces of the Far East Front, Engineer-Major Ryabov

Acting Chief of the UK ORT of the Armoured and Motorized Forces of the Far East Front, Engineer-Major Sviridov"

CAMD RF 38-11355-2548 p. 175

Upgunned T-38 Trials

"Results of trials of a T-38 tank armed with a ShVAK gun from March 15th to 29th, 1944

T-38 tank #4216 armed with a ShVAK gun converted at factory #105 on January 13th 1944 was presented for trials. The engine ran for 2 hours since the last medium repairs.

After arming it with the ShVAK gun, the tank's weight increased by 400 kg. The tank was tested at 100% of combat weight with a crew of 2 men.

The route and trial conditions are described in the attached journal. 910 km were travelled during the trials (402 km on a highway, 508 km on a dirt road, off-road, and over obstacles). The engine worked for 48 hours and 40 minutes.

British Tiger II Intel

The British, impressively enough, were already aware of the King Tiger long before ever seeing it in combat, at least by May of 1944.

On July 18th, 1944, the Germans lost three King Tigers on the Western Front. It doesn't look like the British noticed them, however.

Nashorn Notes

"On firing positions for 88 mm SPGs (Nashorn, formerly Hornisse)

1. During use of self propelled anti-tank guns, it is important to perform thorough reconnaissance (preferably on foot). Frequently, the neighbouring section of the front turns out to have more favourable conditions for firing and ambush positions. In that case, the commander of the anti-tank unit must apply them in the neighbouring sector, and not in his own. The specifics of this weapon require certain flexibility in its use. The only important thing is that it must function as effectively as possible.