Showing posts with label Matilda. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Matilda. Show all posts

Tuesday, 7 June 2016

The Real Matilda I, Continued

Somehow, in English language armoured history, the index "Matilda I" managed to latch onto the Infantry Tank MkI despite some evidence to the contrary. Interestingly enough, this never happened in Russian literature. Here is a page from the Tankomaster magazine, February 1991 edition, listing the A indices of various British tanks.

Holding up this list against the Wikipedia one, it seems identical... almost. In this list, the A11 is not a Matilda, only "Infantry Tank MkI". Soviet wartime documents would have still been classified, meaning that the "nameless" MkI had to have come from an English source. Several other traits hint to this, including referring to the engine on the A16 as "Nuffield Liberty" (contemporary Soviet sources just called it "Liberty") and the transliterations rather than translations of "Centaur", "Cromwell", and "Tortoise".

Monday, 6 June 2016

Soviet Intel on British Tanks

"Notes:
  1. The tanks MkI (infantry), MkI (cruiser) and light MkVII are made in negligible amounts. The first two appear to have been removed from production entirely.
  2. The main types of tanks are the MkIV and MkIVa cruiser tanks (the tanks vary in only small details). The precursor to the MkIV, the MkIII cruiser tank (built in small numbers) differs only in the shape of the turret and potentially has thinner armour.
  3. The latest tanks are the MkIII infantry tank (built on the basis of the MkII cruiser tank) and the light tank MkVII.
  4. In British media, the infantry tank MkIIa is called "Matilda" and the infantry tank MkIII is called "Valentine".
  5. Cruiser tanks MkI and MkII and the infantry tank MkIII are from the same family of tanks.
  6. Cruiser tanks are from the medium tank weight class, infantry tanks can be medium or heavy depending on their weight."

Commenters from a previous article may note that while the Infantry Tank MkII bears the name "Matilda", the Infantry Tank MkI does not. 


Wednesday, 25 May 2016

The Real Matilda I

When seeing the term "Matilda I", many people imagine the awkward looking Infantry Tank MkI (A11). Matilda II evokes the image of the Queen of the Desert we know and love. But should it?


As you can see here, the Matilda I, Infantry Tank MkII, is armed with a 2-pdr gun and a Vickers machinegun, clearly the "senior" Matilda and not the machinegun-only A11. From this document, you can see that the Infantry Tank MkI never bore the name "Matilda".

Via Yuri Pasholok.

Monday, 18 January 2016

Lend Lease Trade-In

Somewhat recently, I wrote about the common myth about the 1st Mechanized Corps trading in their T-34s for Shermans. A reader emailed me and asked me about examples of swapping our domestic vehicles for imported ones. I thought of a good example from the archive of the 16th Independent Tank Brigade.

The brigade started its fighting in 1944 with 32 T-34s, 9 T-70s, and 7 T-60s. In early February, they were taking a heavy beating, with 2-4 T-34s and 3 or 4 light tanks fighting at any given time. They fought in this difficult condition until March, when they were finally given an order to settle down in Dno for the time being. After a six week long 553 km offensive, they deserved a rest, as well as some new tanks.

The next time I can see a full enumeration of the brigade's resources is on July 5th, and it got a little more colourful. 31 T-34s (11 undergoing repairs, 1 in need of evacuation), one T-34 engineering tank, 5 T-70s (2 undergoing repairs), 2 Valentine MkIIIs (1 undergoing repairs), 4 Valentine MkIXs (1 undergoing repairs, 1 in need of evacuation), and 4 Shermans (1 undergoing repairs, 1 in need of transport). This rag-tag gang of unlikely heroes has a strange fuel situation: 7 full resupplies of 1st grade gasoline, 2 of 2nd grade, but only 2 resupplies of diesel.

A subsequent report explains why. The brigade was equipped with whatever was available, as soon as it was available, and with a very flexible definition of "available". Only 7 T-34 tanks received did not require repairs, everything else required medium to major repairs, to be performed by the brigade and 31st Army Repair Base. Brigade mechanics complain about shoddy work by the base's technicians that has to be re-done. Since parts were in short supply, they had to be scavenged from knocked out tanks over a large territory (220 km in radius). By July 9th, the brigade had 27 T-34s, 1 Valentine MkIII, one Valentine MkIX, and 5 Shermans. Only 27 T-34s and one T-70 were capable of driving, and "the technical condition of the tanks (aside from 7 T-34s that arrived from Saratov factory) was not inspiring". While still not fully equipped, the brigade received orders for a 110 km march. The Lend-Lease vehicles were left behind, and 27 T-34s, 4 T-70s, and 3 SU-85s attempted the trek. It took 12 hours, with 2 T-34s, a T-70, and a SU-85 falling behind. The journal complains about a significant amount of dust on the road, causing a breakdown of the engines. Thankfully, once the brigade arrived at their destination, they received 30 new T-34-76 and T-34-85 tanks.

The summer must not have been kind to the brigade, since the brigade receives reinforcements again on August 20th, and what reinforcements are these... 55 Matildas and 11 Valentine MkIXs, "arrived from repair factories and having already fought on the fronts of the Patriotic War". The journal also mentions that two battalions had a T-34 each. As per tradition, it seems, the brigade begins a lengthy 160 km march over difficult terrain, leaving behind 10 Matildas and one Valentine on the way due to breakdowns and 18 Matildas due to a lack of oil. Another 30 km march loses 8 Matildas and 2 Valentines. The conclusion is predictable: "The vehicles received and the crews were not ready for battle... The crews that arrived knew the MkII and MkIX tanks poorly, their drivers were taught little, as a result of which 27 tanks fell behind for technical reasons over a 180 km march."

At the start of September, the brigade ended up with 4 combat ready T-34s (the two they saved plus two more that were repaired), 23 combat ready Matildas, and only one combat ready Valentine. 7 more Matildas and 9 Valentines were knocked out on enemy territory, 13 Matildas and one Valentine were recovered and need medium repairs, and 9 Matildas need major repairs. Only 3 Matildas burned up. I can't tell why (the photocopy is really bad), but by September 4th, the brigade is down to 2 T-34s again, with the other two sent off to another unit.

Sometime in early September, the brigade picked up a few SU-85s to supplement its antiques roadshow, which is good, since there were Panthers ahead. The repair guys again complain about the multitude of vehicles they have to fix up, commenting that parts for the Lend-Lease tanks were not available and had to be scavenged from damaged tanks. The T-34 engineering tank is mentioned again as being the primary method of recovering bogged down tanks. Despite the large amount of Matilda tanks the brigade started out with, there are no working ones left at the end of the month.

The bloodied brigade was then moved to the Stavka's reserves for restructuring. It was transferred to the 1st Polish Army on January 5th, 1945, and received 85 shiny new T-34-85 tanks in February. After such a colourful set of vehicles, it met the end of the war with a full complement of modern fighting machines.

Wednesday, 15 July 2015

Leftovers

"Reporting to TU GBTU KA Chief, Engineer-Colonel comrade Blagonravov

I report that:
  1. From January 1st to July 1st, 1945, the following was sent:
    1. Train car #1726224, transport 105/6023, 160 road wheels for M4A2 tanks, to Bryansk warehouse #2707, June 1st, 1945.
    2. Train car #562541, transport 105/6024, Valentine tank spare parts (74 units), Matilda tank spare parts (1 unit), miscellaneous parts (12 units). Total: 87 units. Sent to Berezaika, June 1st, 1945.
    3. Train car #329148, transport 105/6024, M4A2 spare parts (26 units) to Bryansk warehouse #2707, June 1st, 1945.
    4. 3 ND-10 tractors, transport 109/4864, sent to Balashiha station, repair factory #24, April 1st, 1945.
    5. Workshops:
      1. Mechanical workshop "N": 1
      2. Workshop "H": 6
      3. I-30 charging stations: 4
      4. Total: 11
        Sent by transport 109/4872 to Nara station, to a subsidiary of factory #90.
  2. Loaded, but not shipped:
    1. Harley Davidson motorcycles: 83.
    2. M4A2 armament parts: 262 units.
    3. M4A2 spare parts: 2752 units.
  3. Remains in ports as of July 1st, 1945:
    1. Molotovsk: 
      1. M4A2 parts: 317 units
      2. M4A2 road wheels: 27 units
      3. TE-48 instruments: 2 units
        In total enough for two train cars
    2. Bakaritsa:
      1. ND-10 tractors: 3
      2. Type K welding workshops: 4
      3. Radio workshops: 5
      4. M4A2 instruments: 306 units
      5. M4A2 parts: 53 units
        In total enough for 15 train cars.
Chief of the Foreign Vehicle Acceptance Department of GBTU KA, Guards Engineer-Colonel Trelin."

Wednesday, 18 February 2015

Valentine and Matilda Delivery Quality

"To the Deputy Chair of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, comrade A.I. Mikoyan

A series of defects was discovered at Gorkiy and during subsequent use in the army in MkII (Matilda heavy tank) and MkIII (Valentine medium tank) tanks that arrived from England.
  1. Out of 137 tanks that arrived at Gorkiy, 58 broke down due to frozen water in the engines. Additionally, 20 tank batteries (4 batteries per tank) broke due to freezing of the electrolyte, due to its reduced density.
    We must use imported parts to repair all 58 vehicles, but there are not enough engines and batteries, and we require additional supplies to repair 30 tanks. English representatives confirmed that a portion of the tanks arrived at Arkhangelsk with water in the engine cooling system.
  2. The MkII tank has a compressor for controls and the gearbox that works poorly in winter temperatures. It is necessary to ensure that the compressor works flawlessly in our winter on subsequent shipments.
  3. Many cases of track pin breakages were observed in battle conditions on both tank types, as well as breakages of idler ball bearings on MkIII tanks when moving across rough terrain.
  4. The track faces of both types of tanks are smooth, and the tanks slide around. It is necessary to weld grousers to these tracks.
  5. On MkII tanks, the front sloped (left and right) plates are torn out of the tank when towed. It is necessary to reinforce them.
  6. The MkIII tank has many small defects, such as:
    1. The water drainage valve does not allow for all water to be drained from the engine cooling system. It must be placed in the lowest point of the water pipes.
    2. The vertical position of the compensator coil of the water drainage pipe means that all water cannot be removed from it.
    3. The radiators overcool in winter conditions. It is necessary to install warming shutters.
    4. Rubber tires on the road wheels often slide off. It is necessary to attach them in a more reliable way.
Tanks are not evenly supplied with instruments. Some have more, some have less. It is necessary to equip them according to established norms.

I ask you to report the above to English representatives that supply us with tanks so that the aforementioned defects can be resolved.

GABTU Chief, Lieutenant-General of the Tank Forces, Fedorenko
GABTU Military Commissar, Army Commissar 2nd Grade, Biryukov"

Wednesday, 12 November 2014

Reliability and Repairs

"Between February 22nd, 1943, and March 14th, 1943, 527 tanks were lost in offensive operations by several tank units that operated around the 10th Army. These losses are distributed as follows:

Losses KV T-34 Matilda Valentine M3 Stuart M3 Lee T-60
On marches 14
(14.3%)
44
(29.7%)
16
(41%)
11
(13.3%)
8
(16.6%)
3
(23%)
26
(12.3%)
In battle 84
(85.7%)
104
(70.3%)
23
(58.9%)
72
(86.7%)
40
(83.4%)
10
(77%)
182
(87.4%)

The amount of tanks lost in battle includes the amount of tanks lost in battle due to technical problems, but it was not possible to establish that number.

Out of the losses, most vehicles were repaired by the repair bases or the tank unit's maintenance company, but a significant amount of the losses were permanent.



KV T-34 Matilda Valentine M3 Stuart T-60 T-70
Total losses 98 148 39 83 48 208 8
Repaired at repair base 82
83.6%
102
68.9%
22
56.3%
52
62.5%
21
43.7%
125
60%
1
12.5%
Sent for major repairs 4
4.2%
16
10.8%
11
28.2%
15
18.2%
8
16.6%
25
28%
3
37.5%
Irreparable 12
12.2%
30
20.3%
6
15.5%
16
19.3%
19
39.7%
58
12%
4
50%
"
Of course, the losses are given in the Soviet style, where a single tank can be considered lost several times. For instance, the document gives an example where the 26-tank 117th Tank Brigade lost 25 tanks during marches and combat (3 on marches, 11 knocked out, 11 burned up) and still managed to have 4 tanks come back undamaged between March 18th and March 21st.

The tables paint an interesting picture. The meek T-60 is reliability star, with the traditionally "unreliable" KV keeping close. The KV also largely took insignificant damage, with a very small number of tanks lost irreparably or in bad enough condition to be sent back to the factory for major repairs. Few T-60s are irreparable, but very many have to be sent back for major repairs. 

The T-34 isn't exactly a top performer, with almost 30% of the vehicles lost on the road, but the damage is slight. It is only second to the KV in terms of vehicles repaired in the field and percent of vehicles sent back to the factory. 

The Americans are doing okay on the reliability front. The M3 Lee is a little better than the T-34 in terms of vehicles lost on the road (for some reason there is no data on repairing them), and the Stuart is up there with the best of them in terms of marches. However, it seems very difficult to repair, with the worst numbers for irreparable losses and field repairs aside from the T-70 with its very low sample size.

The contributions of the British are all over the place. The Matilda is faring poorly, with a record number of vehicles breaking during marches and a very high percentage of vehicles that need to be serviced at the factory (although the number of complete losses is low). The Valentine is the complete opposite, with a very low number of breakdowns and very high number of field repairs.

For completeness' sake, let's look at similar numbers for some German tanks.

ORO-T-117

This report covers fighting on the Western Front, 1944 through 1945. Elsewhere, it mentioned that "the majority of Mark III and Mark IV chassis tanks do not have turrets", making it likely that these numbers are more representative of the StuG III and IV. These are some bleak numbers. Out of tanks operated by the Red Army, only the Matilda broke down more. A burned up tank is a total loss, so that's at least 20% of all tanks rendered entirely irreparable. This is about the same rate as a T-34, but the PzIV value doesn't include tanks captured by the enemy (in which case it would be 100% complete loss), or tanks that were rendered irreparable by gunfire and did not brew up. 

Thursday, 23 October 2014

2-pounder HE

Many lamentations have been recorded about the lack of explosive shells for British 2-pounder guns. One solution I've seen involved jury-rigging smoke launchers to fire mortar shells. Another is a little more reasonable.

"A program of trials of 40 mm English high explosive fragmentation tracer AA shells in tank guns
  1. Goal of trials: to establish the possibility of using 40 mm AA shells in a tank gun. Before trials, the following work is done:
    1. The 40 mm shell is disassembled.
    2. The possibility of firmly loading an AA high explosive fragmentation shell into a tank shell casing is tested. The firmness of the load is tested by loading the shell into a tank gun.
    3. The tank gun rifling and shell driving band are measured in order to discover the necessary forcing of the band for satisfactory loading of the shell (not having the driving band prematurely stick into the rifling).
    4. The maximum pressure the shell can bear is calculated by examining mechanical characteristics of the shell and its size.
  2. Supplies for trials:
    1. System: 40 mm English tank gun.
    2. Shell: 40 mm English AA high explosive shell.
    3. Casing: from the 40 mm tank gun.
    4. Propellant: propellant from the English AA shell and domestic propellant with ballistic characteristics close to English 40 mm shell propellant.
  3. Trial process:
    1. Discovery of the propellant load to achieve V0=790 m/s and pressure less than the maximum acceptable pressure calculated in point 4.
      Note: according to information possessed by Artkom, the maximum acceptable pressure for the 40 mm AA high explosive fragmentation tracer shell is 3000 kg/cm^2. This information needs to be confirmed.
    2. Discovery of the propellant load to achieve V0=790 m/s using domestic propellant following points 1 and 3. Propellant will be tested on inert shells. If it is not possible to disarm the shells, testing will be done on shells that are incompletely armed with an inert detonator.
      If it is not possible to achieve a velocity of 790 m/s without surpassing acceptable pressure, trials will continue with the maximum velocity attainable at this pressure.
    3. Further trials will be carried out according to typical testing procedure applicable to HE shells (aside from point 1), using the propellant load established in these trials. Increased pressure is considered 1.1 times the current working pressure.
The trial report should include data for the formation of ballistic tables. The report should also include English markings on the 40 mm shells."

Tuesday, 24 June 2014

Mass Breakdown


Columns: KV-1 with 75 mm armour, KV-3 with 90 mm armour, KV-3 with 120 mm armour, KV-1S. KV-3 with 90 mm of armour is obviously the T-150.

Rows: 
Hull
Left side
Right side
Upper front plate
Lower front plate
Upper rear plate
Lower rear plate
Front bottom plate (40 mm)
Rear bottom plate (30 mm)
Front roof
Engine compartment roof
Internal walls
Hull mass
Turret
Upper rear plate
Lower rear plate
Right side
Left side
Front plate
Frame cover
Roof
Turret holders
Turret weight
Total hull and turret weight

"Mass of the KV-1 tank: 46,000 kg
Mass of the KV-3 with 90 mm of armour: 50,200 kg
Subtracting the mass of the hull, we get:
Internals of the KV-1: 22,540 kg
Internals of the KV-3: 24,300 kg

Taking the weight of the internals of the KV-3 with 120 mm of armour as the same 24,300 kg, and counting that the ZiS-5 is 300 kg heavier, the KV-3 (120 mm) works out to be 52,801 kg.

I deem the construction of a tank with 120 mm of front armour and a 76 mm ZiS-5 gun that weighs no more than 54-55 tons viable."

CAMD RF 38-11355-107

The ZiS-5 isn't the gun that went on the KV-1 and KV-1S, but an older index, referring to a 76 mm tank gun with ballistics of the 3-K model 1931 AA gun.

Another table, comparing the masses of only turrets, but for many more vehicles. The data is approximate, due to manufacturing tolerances individual turrets could end up heavier or lighter.

Vehicle
Turret weight (kg)
With turret ring
Without turret ring
Domestic
KV-1S
5300
5670
T-34 (76 mm)
2700
2890
BT-7
600
645
T-26
750
805
T-80
1250
1340
T-70
1000
1070
T-60
550
590
BA-10
450
485
BA-20
150
165
BA-64
110
120
Captured
Tiger
6000
6450
Panther
4700
5050
PzIV
3000
3220
PzIII
2000
2140
PzII Ausf. B
650
700
SdKfz 221
200
215
SdKfz 222
350
375
Allies
M3 Light
900
965
Churchill
3600
3850
Valentine
1400
1500
Matilda
3100
3320
M3 Medium
1900
2035
M4A2
3500
3750
M4A4
3500
3750

Sadly, these notes do not appear to mention what modification. Another document is provided stating the weight of the Matilda turret to be 3812 kg with the turret ring and 3567 without, with the same figured for the Valentine being 2415 kg and 2210 kg, significantly higher than the ones in the table. However, the latter figures count the gun mantlet, while the former ones presumably do not.

Tuesday, 15 April 2014

Matilda vs Panther at Tartu

From L.V. Gorchakov's collection.

"Report on the combat actions of the 16th Independent Tank Order of the Red Banner Don Brigade from September 1st, 1944 to September 30th, 1944

1. The enemy, taking heavy losses in battles in the vicinity of Tartu was forced by our advancing forces to retreat North-East and North-West of Tartu, fortifying for a defense with elements of the 11th ID, 96th ID, 32 ID, 185 ID, 37th ID, 46th IR, 20th PD, and the Schmitken tank brigade on the Pyvvatu, Bol, [illegible], Paidla, Tila, and marker 44.6 line, simultaneously counterattacking with up to two regiments of infantry and with support of artillery and up to 50 tanks from the regions of [illegible], Zoraku and Marama, striving to take the city of Tartu.

2. The 2nd tank battalion was equipped with new tanks on August 30th, 1944. The brigade received orders from the commander of the North Combat Sector: by 15:00 on August 30th, march from Unipiha to the North-East outskirts of Tartu in order to deflect potential tank counterattacks in the directions of Anne-Tartu, Vadula-Tartu and [illegible]-Tartu.

At 8:00 on August 30th, the Brigade, composed of 18 Matildas, 2 SU-85, one T-34, an evac unit and an AA battery set out on the route of Unipiha-Tartu. Having completed the 25 km march by 14:00, the brigade reached the North-Eastern outskirts of Tartu, placing its tanks in AT ambushes.

The 1st and 3rd battalions were left in Unipiha without functional vehicles, awaiting evacuation and restoration.

According to the orders, the following was done:
  1. The objective was delivered and explained to all personnel.
  2. Observation of tank ambushes and approaches to enemy lines was performed.
  3. Cooperation with infantry and artillery was outlined.
  4. Anti-tank ambushes were set up on main directions: Kazake, height 62.1, Orova-Tila, Vakhi, and Myuta, composed of three tanks and a unit of mechanized infantry each. Reserves: the commander kept a reserve of 5 tanks and 80 men in the region of the wine factory with the goal of reinforcements of AT ambushes at threatened directions.
  5. Tank ambushes in the regions of Letsi and Varevy were prepared to deflect the enemy's counterattack at the river crossings.
Throughout September 1st and 2nd, the 2nd battalion, infantry, and AA battery securely covered Tartu. The enemy did not show activity, but opened artillery fire in the direction of our units. According to the orders of the 67th Army Armoured and Mechanized Forces commander, 8 tanks were removed from ambushes on the night of September 4th and transferred to Unipiha. Others were left in ambush. At 13:00 on September 4th, the enemy attacked with up to two regiments of infantry and 30 Panther tanks, supported with artillery. Enemy tanks moved out from [illegible], Vazula, Lane, Marama and reached Orova, Tila, and Myuta by 15:00.

9 Matilda tanks from the 2nd battalion deflected the attack from anti-tank positions at Kazake, height 62.1, Tila, Myuta, with support from infantry and artillery. The enemy, at the cost of heavy losses, pushed us back from [illegible], Tila, Vakhi, Myuta, having cut off five out out tanks form infantry at Tila and Vakhi. Further advances of enemy tanks and infantry was prevented by artillery fire. 7 Panther tanks were knocked out, as well as 5 APCs, and up to 200 soldiers and officers were killed.

Our losses: 5 tanks destroyed or disabled, 10 men killed or wounded.

At the same time, the enemy attempted to ferry infantry across lake Vyrtserv. Three tanks in ambush at Verevi opened heavy fire and did not allow the enemy to land. Since a landing was impossible, the enemy turned back, having lost one motorboat, two rowboats. Up to 75 soldiers and officers were killed or drowned.

Due to the developing situation, tanks from Unipiha were transferred over to the anti-tank regions at Radi, Cemetery, and Klaoze with the objective to not let enemy tanks and infantry through to the city. At this time, defenses East, North-East, and North of Tartu were reinforced by elements of the 1047th SPG regiment, 379th Guards SPG regiment, 332nd Guards SPG regiment and 351st Guards SPG regiment transferred over from other parts of the front.

The enemy transferred over two more regiments of infantry and up to 25 Panther tanks from Valga by 18:00 on September 5th, 1944, and with up to two regiments of infantry and 30 Panther tanks and 10 APCs, with artillery support, attacked from Pyvvatu, Tila, Vakhi, and Myuga, with the goal of capturing the city of Tartu.

The 2nd battalion and AA battery opened fire from the anti-tank regions at Kazake, Radi, and Klaoze, along with reinforcing tank units, in cooperation with infantry and artillery. With heavy losses, the enemy was forced to retreat to his starting positions, leaving up to 175 soldiers and officers, 9 tanks, and 5 APCs on the battlefield. From September 6th to 10th, the enemy did not attempt any engagements. limiting himself to periodic artillery fire.

The 2nd battalion and AA battery continued to hold their line at Kazake, height 62.1, Radi, Klaoze and Verevi, carefully observing the enemy.

According to orders from the commander of the North Combat Sector, the tanks still remaining in ambush were removed on the night from September 10th and September 11th and were relocated to Memmatsi by 5:00 on September 11th, 1944."

Friday, 11 October 2013

Lend-Lease Shopping Trip

CAMD RF 38-11369-68

"Report on the question of purchasing American self-propelled guns.

If possible, I think that there is reason to purchase 90 mm AA guns on the chassis of a medium tank (used as an anti-tank gun) and 155 mm guns on the chassis of a medium tank. 

Aside from that, it is necessary to purchase quad-.50 cal machine guns on trucks. Preferably not in small numbers, but up to 1000 at a time, with 10-15 ammunition loads. 

As for the fifty 57 mm guns we were offered, I think there is reason to buy them, but only if we receive no less than 500 units at a later date.

Colonel-General Fedorenko."

Obviously the 90 mm gun on a medium tank is the M36 Jackson, and the 155 mm gun on a medium tank is the M12 Gun Motor Carriage. It is interesting to note that the report is dated June 1943 (the date is cut off), and the Jackson only started production in November of that year. The Americans must have been very forthcoming with their latest tank development information. Ultimately, no M36es or M12s were sent to the USSR. 

The quad-.50 caliber machine guns on trucks ended up materializing as the M17: four .50 caliber machine guns on the M5 US halftrack. The USSR received 1000 of them in 1944. 

M17 AA halftracks on the 3rd Belorussian Front, 1944

Here is the final conclusion for what the Red Army needed for its summer 1943 campaign:

"British and Canadian tanks:
  1. Increase the number of ordered MkIII Valentines with improved armament to 2000 units.
  2. Cease orders of the MkVII Tetrarch.
  3. Complete the current contract for 1000 MkII Matilda tanks, and cease all subsequent orders. All incoming tanks must have 76 mm guns.
  4. Begin purchase of the MkIV Churchill tank according to the current protocol for heavy tank regiments.
  5. Order no less than 500 Universal APCs with a 13.5mm Boys AT rifle.
American tanks:
  1. Complete the current order for 1200 M3 Stuart tanks, and cease all subsequent orders.
  2. Do not order the M5 light tank, due to no advantages over the M3 light tank.
  3. Complete the current order for 1000 M3 Grant medium tanks. After that, explore the question of ordering at least 1000 M4 medium tanks with a diesel engine and improved armour.
  4. Order at least 500 light anti-tank SU-57 SPGs"

Friday, 6 September 2013

Tank Riders

You frequently see photos of Soviet infantry riding on tanks into battle. Just how many people could you fit on one tank? The "Short tactical-technical manual" published by the People's Commissariat of Defense has the answer! The following are the official numbers of how many riders would fit:

KV-1 and KV-1S: 15
T-34: 12
T-70: 6
Matilda: 6
Valentine: 6
M4A2: 6
M3 Light: 6

The Sherman, despite having similar dimensions to the T-34, can only sit half as many men. That is because there are no surfaces above the tracks to stand on, and not nearly as many handles to hold on to.

Of course, official numbers didn't stop creative arrangement of larger number of infantry. Here you see 8 soldiers riding on a T-70 instead of the "official" 6:


This kind of trick would only work on very good terrain. The front soldier has nothing to hold on to, and, if the tank shakes, too much, will fall off. 8 seems to not be the limit of Soviet ingenuity. According to CAMD RF 38-11355-1420, a T-70 carried 20 men into battle at Kudinovo. The report rightfully complains about insufficient amounts of things to hold on to when carrying that many. Sadly, there is no photo of that, but there is a re-enactment!



The manual also has some data for trucks:

GAZ-AA 1.5 ton truck ("polutorka"): 10-12
ZiS-5 truck: 16-20
ZiS-6 truck: 16-20

Wednesday, 4 September 2013

"Obsolete" Light Tanks

T-26, BT, Valentine. Those are all light tanks, nearly obsolete as soon as the war started. However, a tank is a tank, and nobody is going to say no to a perfectly functional gun on tracks during a war as brutal as WWII. Even after the appearance of such fearsome beasts as Panthers, Tigers, and ISes, these older models don't go anywhere.

In the early war, the Germans readily used "inferior" Soviet armour. In a report from Zhukov to Stalin (CAMD RF 208-2511-26) on the destruction of the enemy at Skirmanovo, Zhukov writes: "By preliminary counts, in these battles we have captured 28 prisoners, 30 tanks, including 10 Soviet BT-7s, one long-range gun, 6 AT guns, motorcycles, cars, and other military items." The battles occurred on November 12-13 of 1941.

In 1942, the need for captured tanks didn't go anywhere. CAMD RF 38-11355-644 says: "Elements of the 22nd army re-captured 5 T-26es and 2 T-34s from the enemy. The tanks are functional, but lack telescopic sights. Please indicate where to receive 5 T-26 TOPs and 2 T-34 TOPs. Additionally, please advise on the procedure for receiving telescopic sights, both for domestic and captured German vehicles."

Of course, these tanks also appear in Soviet records in the late war.

From the records of the 49th Guards Heavy Tank Regiment: "25.01.44. 23 BT-5 and 3 BT-7 received from the 12th OUTP of the Leningrad front."

From the records of the 82nd Independent Tank Regiment: "At the end of 15.06.44, we received five T-26 tanks, sent from the #4 repair factory in Leningrad.
Condition of our material resources:
...
T-26:
Assigned: 10
Combat-ready: 6
Undergoing repairs: 290th repair base: 3 49th repair base: 3"

However, these tanks did decrease in effectiveness, and were gradually transferred to less critical theaters. A list of equipment transferred to the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Army on February 10th, 1944, contains 13 BT-7s with 71TK radios and 12 BT-7s with no radios.

The British realized the same thing with their tanks. On April 12th, 1944, 90 Valentines in Iraq were transferred from British service to the Soviet Independent Maritime Army.

By November of 1944, it seems that these old tanks are still in service, although the M3 Lees and Stuarts are thinning out.



This table shows the amounts of foreign tanks at repair base #82. By November 1st, the repair base is in possession of 193 MK-3 tanks (Valentine), 130 MK-2 tanks (Matilda), and 175 M4A2 tanks. No M3 Light (Stuart) or M3 Medium (Lee) were present at the beginning of October, and none were brought in for repairs that month.

Monday, 11 March 2013

World of Tanks History Section: British Tank Building


On July 28th, 1914, the cannonade of a new war rolled through Europe. Nobody thought that the conflict would be a global war of attrition. All participants assumed they could quickly crush their opponents in a few months of decisive offensives. New countries joined the fight, armies took colossal casualties, and Europe was crisscrossed with trenches from the north shores to the south. Offensives were ineffective. Tens, sometimes hundreds, of thousands of lives were given for mere kilometers. In order to break the stalemate, all participants developed new, deadlier weapons. Flamethrowers, poison gases, airplanes. The British invented the tank.

The first tanks went into battle on September 15th, 1916, at the river Somme. Armoured monsters broke through the German defenses, but the effect was only tactical, not strategic. Overall, tanks failed to play a decisive role in WWI. Two decades went by before the full potential of armoured vehicles was discovered. Over these years, not only the tanks themselves evolved, but their use in combat. Surprisingly, the British, pioneers of tank building, had problems with both these aspects.

As always, the biggest problem was the human factor. The British Ministry of Defense had many opponents to armoured warfare. D. Brown wrote that military commanders treated the tank corps with hatred and jealousy. Claims that tanks were a waste of budget were common.

The pro-tank camp wasn't running too smoothly either. There was no single opinion about what tanks should do on the battlefield. Two viewpoints were common. One was that the tanks should advance with infantry, cover it with armour, and help it fight enemy infantry. Other tanks, field guns, and bunkers were the responsibility of artillery. The second camp was of the opinion that tanks had to act like cavalry. They would break through to the rear of the enemy, strike at their communications, warehouses, attack infantry that is matching and incapable of effectively fighting back.

At the end, the British decided to sit on two chairs at once. Tanks were divided into infantry and cruiser types. The first were slow and well armoured. The second were fast and thinly armoured. The armament was more or less the same. Although it was originally proposed that infantry tanks should just have machine guns, they were eventually upgraded to AT guns. The caliber of these guns was limited, and neither cruiser nor infantry tanks were equipped with HE shells.

Let us closely examine the two British tank families at the beginning of WWII.

Infantry tanks, at the beginning, had no AT guns. An example of such a tank is the Matilda I, which was built starting in 1937. It was a clumsy, but well armoured tank. In 1940, when the British first crossed paths with the Germans, it turned out that German AT guns were ineffective against it. Sadly, the advantage in defense was completely nullified by its poor offensive capability.

In 1939, the Matilda II entered production as the heaviest British tank of the start of the war. Its 60 mm armour could only be penetrated by 88mm AA guns and 76 mm guns on Marder II tank destroyers. Unlike its first modification, the Matilda II carried a 2-pounder gun. For the beginning of the war, this was enough. However, by the middle of 1942, the Matilda's gun stopped being a significant threat. A larger gun was not possible due to the small turret ring.

The best infantry tank of the early war was the Valentine. This vehicle first saw combat in North Africa. The Valentines were produced until 1944, even though it was deemed obsolete by 1942. It was hindered by its low speed and weak gun. Unlike the Matilda, the Valentine could be fitted with a 57 mm (6 pounder) gun. The cramped turret fit two crewmen, which reduced the crew's effectiveness. Around half of all Valentines built were shipped to the USSR under Lend-Lease.

As for cruiser tanks, at the start of WWII they were far from perfect, and distinguished themselves with poor reliability. Cruiser tanks were based on Walter Christie's vehicles.

The first cruiser tank was the Vickers Mk I, produced in small numbers since 1934. They were practically not used in the war, even though several remained on active duty until 1941. Most tanks were used for training purposes.

Vickers Mk II and Mk II were a little better than the first model, but were weakly armoured and lightly armed. Still, there were many non-combat losses, credited to the poor reliability of these tanks.

The Vickers Mk IV was supposed to solve this situation. The armour was increased to 30 mm by welding armour plates on to the turret and weak spots. This gave the turret a strange 6 sided shape, which the Covenanter inherited. The suspension was also improved. The Mk IV was much more combat capable than its predecessor, but was still broke down unacceptably often.

In 1940-1941, Britain suffered heavy losses on all fronts. In France, North Africa, Greece, British tanks were inferior to their opponents. Sometimes this was due to technological superiority, sometimes due to incompetent commanders. Britain had to take drastic measures.

The Tank Committee was reshuffled in 1941, after British defeats against Germany's forces. The committee was joined to the Ministry of Defense, and given control of all enterprises that dealt with manufacturing tanks or developing tank doctrine. This was vitally important, since the current state of affairs rendered the British army incapable of properly completing the objectives of a modern war.

Based on the experiences of 1940-1942, the British concluded that their tanks were ineffective against almost all vehicles of the enemy, aside from very old ones, like the PzI. Light tanks were placed on scout duties only, and, even there, they were slowly replaced by armoured cars.

Infantry tank experience in Europe did not go as poorly. As an example, one can look at the battle of Arras on May 21st, 1940. Matilda I and II tanks of the 4th Royal Tank Regiment attacked two regiments of the 7th tank division and a regiment of the SS "Death's Head" division. The Matilda's armour, 60-78 mm thick, could only be lightly dented by German 37 mm AT shells. The SS "retreated with signs of panic" or, in more colloquial terms, fled. The British were only stopped when the Germans calmed down and towed in 88 mm AA guns. Infantry tanks could be improved by heavier armour and better weapons.

Cruiser tanks had the most room for improvement. On one hand, the cruiser tanks that Britain had in its possession distinguished themselves with neither combat effectiveness, nor reliability. On the other hand, the army needed a proper universal tank that was capable of both accompanying infantry and completing independent objectives. Cruiser tanks were the obvious choice here, but something had to be done about their engines, with the service life of several hours and their flaky ventilation and suspension. Skipping forward a bit, the British only accomplished this by 1944.

Both cruiser and infantry tanks required improved weaponry. The main tank gun at the time was the 2 pounder (40 mm) gun. It was ineffective against tanks of the time and nearly worthless against infantry: HE shells were either absent, or of such poor quality that tankers discarded them for AP.

It was necessary to use a 57 mm (6 pound) gun. The British had a gun like this, and it was used on the Valentine since 1943. For a very long time, most British tanks were armed with the 57 mm gun that, while better than the 2 pounder, was still not powerful enough. A 75 mm gun was only adapted in 1944.

Despite their active participation in the war and a realistic view of a tank's requirements, the British created several very unfortunate vehicles. For example, the Covenanter. This Christie suspension cruiser tank was released with the 2 pounder gun, and was very unreliable. By the time its technical problems were ironed out, it was obsolete. Its heir, the Crusader, was considered to be very comfortable to drive and use, but was not loved by tankers. The reasons for this were the same: poor gun, thin armour, low reliability.

The Matilda was replaced by the Churchill, which will be the topic of another article. It was a very strange tank for its time. It was probably more suited for the battlefields of WWI. Like all infantry tanks, it was slow, and had a questionable weapon layout. The turret held a 2 pounder gun. The hull, a 76 mm howitzer. This was quickly seen as a poor choice, and the Churchill was modernized. The howitzer was removed, the main gun was replaced with a 57 mm, and later a 75 mm gun. There were also fire support tanks, with 95 mm howitzers. One of the Churchill's problems was its narrow hull. It was impossible to enlarge the turret ring, and the existing turret was not large enough for a bigger gun.

This problem was addressed by a new infantry tank, the Super Churchill, also known as the Black Prince. It was largely based on the Churchill tank, but with a wider hull. The larger turret managed to fit in a 17 pounder gun. By May of 1945, when 6 Black Princes were ready for testing, the vehicle's layout and armament were already obsolete. The tank never had a chance to see combat before all work on it stopped.

The Cromwell, on the other hand, was a breakthrough. Developed in 1941-1943, it was armed with a 57 mm or 75 mm gun, and, with the "Meteor" airplane engine, it was the fastest British tank at the time. The Cromwell was a decent tank, but by 1943, the Germans had Tigers and Panthers. The 75 mm gun was insufficient against them, and the small turret ring prevented a larger gun from being mounted.

A more powerful gun was mounted on the Cromwell's successor, the Comet. With a wider and longer turret, a 77 mm gun with a muzzle velocity of 787 m/s was installed. This was the most powerful cruiser tank of WWII. It was not as good as a Panther, but significantly better than the German PzIV, which remained Wehrmacht's most common tank.

A cruiser tank nicknamed "British Panther" was built after WWII. It was called the Centurion. It had an angled welded hull, a 17 or 20 pounder gun, and remained in use until 1970. Later versions of the tank (starting in the 1950s) were armed with the 105 mm rifled L7 gun. This tank served as a basis for the experimental FV4202, which, due to a redesigned hull shape (the driver was now lying down), was smaller, lighter, and more maneuverable. The tank had the same 105 mm gun. The FV4204 was not mass produced, since at that point, Main Battle Tanks were conceived. The British themselves, in 1945, agreed that the idea of splitting tanks into cruiser and infantry was a poor one.

The last heavy tanks of Britain were the Caernarvon and Conqueror. They were built as heavily armed tanks, meant to combat the tanks of the enemy. This narrow specialization, and a large amount of technical problems, led to only 180 of these tanks built in various modifications.

Caernarvon and Conqueror were meant to fight enemy tanks from large distances. Based on the Conqueror chassis, another heavy tank was being developed, the FV215b. At first, it was meant to have a 183 mm gun with a drum type autoloader, but the gun was incapable of rotation, and had to be installed without any kind of turret. One close call with an HE shell, and the crew was dead and the tank inoperable. At first, this was solved by welding a box on top of the tank. Later, a turret was built, but had to be placed in the rear of the hull. 120 mm and 130 mm weapons were tested as well. The tank was not mass produced.

To summarize, while the British were the first to put tanks on the battlefield, they did not stay in the lead for long. Perhaps, this was due to the United Kingdom's geographical location on an island, with a reduced priority given to land forces compared to ships and aviation. When the time came to fight on land, the British were incapable of catching up to Germany and the USSR, whose tanks were the main striking force.

Original article available here: part 1 and part 2.